INTRODUCTION
International law derives from two primary sources: treaties and customary international law (CIL).' The proper status of these two sources in the U.S. legal system is among the persistent debates in contemporary U.S. foreign relations law. In its past several terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has had the opportunity to provide fresh guidance on both debates. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court addressed a claim under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 2 -an act passed by the First Congress in 1789-for violation of a CIL prohibition on arbitrary detention. 3 In the course of addressing the import of the ATS, the Court also spoke to the domestic legal status of CIL. Much has been said about what Sosa means both for the future of ATS litigation and for the domestic role of GIL. 4 This Essay does not reengage those questions. Instead, this Essay focuses on the import of a more recent landmark decision: Medellin v. Texas. 5 In Medellin, the Supreme Court addressed the domestic status of treaties in determining whether judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) are judicially enforceable federal law. 6 Medellin represents the Court's most important pronouncement on the domestic status of treaties in almost two hundred years. 7 Commentators have begun to sort out what the decision means for treaties in domestic law, 8 but the import of the decision for ATS litigation and for the domestic status of both CIL and international law more generally has been neglected by the literature. This Essay fills that void. Part I explains how Medellin narrows prospects for both treaty-and CIL-based claims under the ATS. Part II demonstrates that Medellin manifests the same separation of powers perspective as Sosa, thus supporting the revisionist position in the debate over the domestic status of CIL. Part III identifies how Medellin contributes to the development of a uniform doctrine governing the status of both treaties and CIL in the U.S. legal system.
I. MEDELLIN AND ATS LITIGATION

A. Treaty Claims Under the ATS
The ATS vests federal district courts with "jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 9 The statute has provided the practical context in which the debate over CIL's domestic status has occurred. The ATS and the Second Circuit decision that brought it out of obscurity have generated a significant number of lawsuits based on violations of international law.' 0 Most of these suits have dealt with violations of customary international law, but, because the ATS also provides jurisdiction over claims based on treaty violations, various treaty-based claims have also been raised.
For example, a dual citizen of Australia and the United Kingdom who was convicted of drug crimes in the United States sued the President of the United States and other U.S. officials, claiming that their failure to transfer him to the United Kingdom to complete his sentence violated the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons." Finding no requirement to transfer in the treaty, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the claim.' 2 In another suit, the representative of a plane crash victim's estate sued the plane's manufacturer and operator.' 3 The representative alleged a wrongful death claim pursuant to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention), premising jurisdiction on the ATS.
14 Because " [t] he [Warsaw] Convention itself does not seek to outlaw accidents, crashes and other events causing death, injury or property loss," the court concluded that the ATS did not confer jurisdiction.
1 5 As a final example, a Nigerian citizen convicted of drug crimes in the United States sued various U.S. officials under the ATS for failure to notify him of his right under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to contact the Nigerian consulate.' 6 The court dismissed the claim based on the plaintiffs failure to identify a tort committed in violation of the Vienna Convention and on his failure to carry his burden as to causation and damages.' 7 These decisions illustrate that there are numerous ob- stacles to the successful prosecution of an ATS claim based on a treaty violation, including the requirement that the claim sound in tort.' 8 The Court's decision in Medellin further obstructs ATS claims that are grounded in treaty violations in at least two important ways. First, Medellin adopts a broad view of treaty non-self-execution. To understand the significance of this position, it is helpful to understand the academic debate against which the decision occurred.
Scholars have long challenged the constitutionality of the non-selfexecution doctrine, though these challenges have been a matter of degree. Despite sometimes broad language, scholars skeptical of non-selfexecution recognize that the doctrine may apply in limited circums- Sloss acknowledges that "a treaty provision has no domestic legal effect in the absence of implementing legislation if it purports to accomplish something that, under our constitutional system, requires legislation approved by both Houses of Congress. 2 7 But, unlike Paust, Sloss perceives appropriation as such an act. 28 Sloss also recognizes that a treaty may be non-self-executing if it is indeterminate or executory, creates only state-to-state obligations rather than obligations to private persons, or contravenes the constitutional rights of individuals or constitutionally-mandated principles of federalism. 29 At the same time, Sloss concludes that, while treaty makers tion thereto)").
23 25. Id. at 80; see also id. at 70-72 (giving historical account of the domestic implementing legislation exception to self-execution); id. at 76-78 (discussing the war power exception). This does not mean, in Paust's view, that a treaty that "addresses an obligation of signatories to assure that any necessary implementing legislation is forthcoming" is necessarily non-self-executing. Id. at 91 n.98. The treaty may, for example, be non-self-executing in countries that do not recognize self-execution but self-executing in countries that do not require implementing legislation. Despite these varied academic efforts to narrow non-self-execution, the Medellin Court adopted a fairly expansive view of the doctrine. No member of the Court suggested that all treaties-or even all treaties not contemplating action that is constitutionally assigned to federal actors other than the treaty makers-are self-executing. In dissent, Justice Breyer endorsed the narrowest view of the non-self-execution doctrine, but even he recognized that treaties may be non-self-executing under certain circumstances. 32 To him, the critical question (answered largely by the Supremacy Clause), 33 was whether a treaty "'addresses itself to the political ... department[s]' for further action or to 'the judicial department' for direct enforcement." 34 To Justice Breyer, the answer to this question depends not on whether and how the treaty addresses the self-execution question, 35 but on "practical, context-specific" criteria, including text, drafting history, subject matter, whether enforcement of the treaty would "engender constitutional controversy," and whether the treaty provides definite legal standards or requires the creation of a new cause of action. 36 Under this approach, treaties addressing war and peace, for example, would be non-self-executing because they are addressed to the political branches. Justice Breyer thus acknowledges a role for non-self-execution, albeit (compared to the majority) a modest one. Moreover, given his focus on the objective, contextual character of the treaty (as one addressed to ei- [Vol. 50:2 ther the political branches or the courts) and the multivariate nature of his analysis, Justice Breyer arguably gives the judiciary greater discretion than does the majority with regard to the domestic status of treaties, including the discretion to categorize the same treaty differently in different contexts.
38
The majority found that a greater range of treaties would be non-selfexecuting. 39 In particular, it endorsed the notion that a treaty may be non-self-executing if the treaty makers so intended. 40 Moreover, while the Court did not explicitly announce a presumption that treaties are non-self-executing, its self-execution analysis includes considerations that will likely lead lower courts to classify treaties as non-selfexecuting more frequently. 4 ' For example, the majority considered the practical consequences of concluding that ICJ judgments are unassailable federal law under the relevant treaties. 4 2 Such a conclusion would threaten preemption of both state and federal law and create the possibility of domestically unreviewable ICJ orders that set aside domestic convictions and sentences. 4 3 As discussed more fully below, 44 this and other considerations on which the Court relied reflect a separation of powers vision under which courts should be reluctant to displace the primary domestic lawmakers and conductors of foreign affairs. 45 This limitation on the judiciary's role means that fewer treaties will be deemed self-executing.
If a treaty is non-self-executing, it is, at a minimum, not judicially enforceable even in a court that possesses jurisdiction to hear treaty claims. 46 As a result, violation of a non-self-executing treaty cannot give 38. See id. at 1385 (suggesting that, pursuant to the same treaty obligations, some ICJ judgments might be self-executing and others not).
39. See id. at 1361-65 (majority opinion). 47 The Court noted that the ICCPR was "ratified.., on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts. 48 The Court thus concluded that the ICCPR could not "establish the relevant and applicable rule of international law" on which AlvarezMachain sought to rely. 49 Because a non-self-executing treaty like the ICCPR cannot itself support an ATS claim, Medellin's broad notion of non-self-execution limits the range of potentially successful treaty claims under the ATS.
See infra
Medellin directly limits treaty-based ATS claims in another respect: Even when the relevant treaty is self-executing, a private plaintiff may not sue for a treaty violation in the absence of a cause of action. The Medellin Court endorsed a presumption, adopted by several circuits, "that '[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.,, 50 The dissent was similarly wary of judicial creation of treaty-based causes of action. 5 '
The conclusion that treaties themselves do not generally create private rights of action would not obstruct treaty-based suits if the ATS created, or authorized federal courts to create, a cause of action for violations of international agreements. However, in Sosa, the Supreme Court concluded that the ATS is merely jurisdictional. 5 2 There was no we mean by 'self-executing' is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a 'non-self-executing' treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law."), and id. at 1369 (describing execution as rendering a treaty "binding on domestic courts"). For further discussion of the meaning of non-self-execution, see Bradley, supra note 7, at 541, 547-50 (discussing the ambiguity in Medellin regarding the effect of non-selfexecution); Curtis A. Bradley [Vol. 50:2 suggestion that the Court's conclusion would be different for the portion of the ATS addressing jurisdiction over treaty claims. The treaty provision of the ATS is but a clause in the same sentence addressing jurisdiction over CIL-based claims. 5 3 Furthermore, the reasons the Court gave for finding the ATS to be jurisdictional apply equally in the treaty context: namely, (a) that the ATS originally "gave the district courts 'cognizance' of certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law"; (b) that the ATS was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which otherwise solely addressed jurisdiction; and (c) that the drafters and enactors of the ATS understood "the distinction between jurisdiction and cause of action. 54 The jurisdictional finding in Sosa did not completely preclude federal courts from creating causes of action for some international law violations. After holding that the ATS was jurisdictional, the Court found that the intent of the enacting Congress gave rise to limited, residual authority for the federal courts to recognize causes of action based on GIL. 55 The Court reasoned that the First Congress expected that certain claims based on the law of nations, "admitting of a judicial remedy," could be prosecuted in the federal courts pursuant to ATS jurisdiction. 5 6 But the claims were few, given the recognition at the time that "'offenses against [the] law [of nations] are principally incident to whole states or nations,' and not individuals seeking relief in court., 57 Presumably, Congress also thought that treaties-to the extent they transcended state-to-state rights and duties-would be enforced under the ATS only if the treaties themselves created a private right of action. 5 " Medellin, of course, endorses the presumption that treaties do not create rights of action. 59 Plaintiffs seeking to rectify treaty violations through the ATS must either overcome this presumption or identify a cause of action in some other source. 60 The difficulty of establishing a cause of action, in conjunction with the requirement that the treaty violated be selfexecuting, significantly hinders treaty-based ATS claims.
B. Customary International Law Claims Under the ATS
As treaty claims under the ATS are relatively rare and face significant hurdles, Medellin's limitations on such claims have a limited practical impact. However, Medellin's approach to treaty self-execution is also relevant to ATS claims based on CIL. These claims are far more common than claims based on treaties. For example, in the seminal case of Kadic v. Karadzic, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully stated individual-capacity claims of genocide and war crimes against the defendant, the commander of Bosnian-Serb military forces and "the President of a three-man presidency of [a] self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina., 6 1 Similarly, in the significant case of Doe v. Unocal, Burmese villagers sued various oil companies for "directly or indirectly subject[ing] the villagers to forced labor, murder, rape, and torture" in the construction of a gas pipeline in Burma. 62 Other suits against corporations have addressed, inter alia, violations of the rights to life, health, and sustainable development caused by intraterritorial pollution from mining-related activities, 63 and violations based on the administration of experimental medicine without obtaining informed consent. 64 Aliens have also sued U.S. officials and contractors for violations of CIL in the conduct of the war on terrorism. Plaintiffs have sued, for example, for prolonged arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment resulting from the Central Intelligence Agency's extraordinary rendition practices. olation of a CIL norm against "'arbitrary' detention defined as officially sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some government."
68 Alvarez-Machain relied on the ICCPR as evidence that CIL embraced the alleged norm. 69 The Court, however, concluded that, even if Alvarez-Machain's assertion were "an accurate reading of the [ICCPR]," he had mustered "little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding customary norm today.°7 0 The Court thus discounted the evidentiary value of non-self-executing treaties in the identification of actionable norms of CIL. 7 ' Medellin took the next step toward limiting CIL-based ATS claims. 72 By giving the doctrine of non-self-execution a broader scope than its critics would afford, 73 the Court increased the number of treaties that might be classified as non-self-executing. Because Sosa discounted the evidentiary value of non-self-executing treaties in establishing CIL claims, Medellin thinned the evidence available to plaintiffs seeking to recover under the ATS for violations of CIL.
1I. MEDELLIN AND THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In addition to limiting ATS claims based on treaty and CIL violations, Medellin bears on the broader and more significant question of CIL's domestic legal status. This issue has split scholars into two factions: a modernist camp and a revisionist camp. 74 Modernists maintain that CIL is federal common law that federal courts may apply in the absence of positive authorization; revisionists argue that either the politi- 
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cal branches or the Constitution must authorize federal judicial reliance on CIL as a domestic rule of decision. 75 Although both camps purported to find an endorsement of their position in Sosa, 7 6 Medellin tips the scale toward the revisionist position by displaying the same separation of powers vision that revisionists perceived in Sosa.
The separation of powers perspective underlying Sosa is apparent in the considerations that the Sosa Court identified to guide lower courts in recognizing causes of action based on CIL. 77 Primary among these considerations was the intent of the political branches. 78 It was the intent of the First Congress that led to recognition of some residual judicial authority to recognize CIL-based claims, 79 just as it was the First Congress's intent (as well as the absence of broader intent in subsequent Congresses) that limited the scope of that residual authority. Thus, federal courts may only recognize claims for violations of customary international law norms as specifically defined and widely accepted as the CIL norms Congress presumably had in mind in enacting the ATS. 8°T he requirements of specific definition and wide acceptance, grounded as they are in congressional intent, reflect a separation of powers vision in which authority to make domestic law based on CIL derives from the primary federal lawmaker--Congress. The requirements confirm that vision by communicating the sense that federal courts should not fill otherwise vague CIL norms with specific content, particularly where doing so would have significant foreign policy implications or would commit the United States to CIL obligations that other states have not assumed. ' Although the specific-definition and mutuality requirements played the dominant role in Sosa, the Supreme Court's separation of powers vision appeared in other considerations as well. In connection with the These additional considerations reveal a separation of powers vision that leaves primary responsibility for lawmaking and foreign affairs to the political branches rather than the courts.
This separation of powers vision is also manifest in the Sosa Court's comments on the limited role of the federal judiciary-comments that motivated, at a minimum, the specific-definition and mutuality considerations discussed above. 86 As the Court explained, "there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action" based on CIL. 87 It is now generally understood that common law is made, not found or discov- Not only should the federal courts hesitate to infringe on the political branches' lawmaking authority, they should also be "wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs." 93 Making common law based on CIL risks such impingement because CIL-based claims can involve U.S. courts in the sensitive task of assessing the international legality of foreign sovereigns' actions toward their own citizens. 94 Had Congress authorized broad recognition of common law claims based on CIL, the Court's concerns for overstepping the federal judiciary's role in lawmaking and foreign affairs would be mitigated. 95 But in the ATS context there is "no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity." 96 Thus, in keeping with Sosa's separation of powers vision, federal courts should be wary of recognizing ATS claims based on CIL.
Medellin is grounded in the same view of separation of powers. The Medellin Court was required to consider whether U.S. treaty obligations with regard to the International Court of Justice were self-executing in order to decide if the ICJ's decision in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals 97 was automatically enforceable federal law. The factors that informed the Court's self-execution analysis disclose a separation of powers perspective similar to the one underlying Sosa.
Although the Court's opinion is not without ambiguity, the primary consideration guiding the Court's self-execution analysis is the intent of the political branches-specifically, the intent of the President and Senate that adopted the treaty obligation. 98 After a lengthy analysis, the Court concluded that "[n]othing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by 'many of our most fundamental constitutional protections."' 9 9 As in Sosa, the Court indicated in Medellin that the political branches control the extent to which treaties are judicially enforceable domestic law.
In ascertaining the intent of the political branches, the Court first re- ter, which requires that member states "undertake[] to comply with" ICJ decisions in cases to which they are party. 10 2 This language, with its absence of specific imperatives, contemplates future steps to comply with ICJ judgments rather than an intent on behalf of the treaty makers to render such judgments immediately enforceable in U.S. courts.
0 3
What sort of language would be required to establish self-execution? Justice Breyer wrote in his dissenting opinion that the majority imposed a clear-statement obligation on treaty makers who wish to produce a self-executing treaty.
1 0 4 There is certainly language in the majority opinion to support such a reading. Citing "general principles of interpretation," the Court explained "that 'absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State."' 10 5 Similarly, the Court stated that the executive may create a self-executing treaty "by ensuring that [the treaty] contains language plainly providing for domestic enforceability," but "[o]nce a treaty is ratified without provisions clearly according it domestic effect," Congress must decide whether the treaty will have domestic effect. 1 0 6 At the same time, the Court rejected "the dissent's suggestion ... [that its] approach [or its] cases require that a treaty provide for self-execution in so many talismanic words." ' 10 7 To the extent the dissent is correct that the majority imposed a clear statement rule or at least favored a clear statement, the Court certainly narrowed the judicial role in treaty enforcement. Even if the Court adopted something less than a clear statement requirement, its attempt to discern the treaty makers' intent from the treaty text places control over the self-execution question principally in the political branches. In addition to its reliance on the text of the treaties, the Court considered alternatives to enforcement in U.S. courts.' 0 8 The UN Charter provides for referral to the Security Council in the event of noncompliance with an ICJ judgment.' 0 9 The existence of an alternative remedy counsels against automatic judicial enforcement, 11° particularly when the remedy provided is contingent and diplomatic, not judicial."' The existence of such a remedy is especially significant where the President and Senate, in ratifying the relevant treaties, fully understood that "the United States retained the unqualified right to" veto attempts at enforcement through the Security Council, leaving "no reason to believe that" they signed up for domestic judicial enforcement that would undermine the veto option." 2 The Court's reliance on the Security Council alternative to judicial enforcement manifests a desire to avoid undermining the political branches' foreign policy discretion. The UN Charter acknowledges that states will have to make decisions regarding compliance." 3 The Court recognized that the political branches, not the courts, should make the delicate decision "whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment," particularly since the Constitution commits the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs to the President and Congress.' 14 The Court was also sensitive to the political branches' lead role in foreign affairs in recognizing that the executive's consistent interpretation of the relevant treaty obligations as non-self-executing "is entitled to great weight." ' " 15 The Court further protected the political branches' foreign affairs authority by rejecting Justice Breyer's expansive view of self-execution. According to the majority, Justice Breyer's multivariate approach would permit the judiciary to "pick and choose which [treaties] shall be binding United States law ... and which shall not."
116 Under this analysis, "the same treaty sometimes gives rise to United States law and sometimes does not, .. . depending on an ad hoc judicial assessment."" ' 7 The Constitution's assignment of the power to create treaties, including treaties that qualify as federal law, to the political branches excludes the role Justice Breyer assigns to the judiciary." 8 Justice Breyer's approach "is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law." ' ' 9 110. See Moore, supra note 4, at 45-46. Moreover, Justice Breyer's approach risks negative foreign policy consequences, as the United States and other countries would be hesitant to "enter into treaties that are sometimes enforceable and sometimes not," treaties that would, in essence, give "a blank check to the judiciary. ' ' 2° Justice Breyer countered that the Court's approach would have serious foreign policy consequences, as it would call into question compromissary clauses in many existing U.S. treaties. 1 21 The Court, however, dismissed this argument on four grounds: (a) other compromissary clauses may produce ICJ judgments with immediate domestic effect; (b) those compromissary clauses that do not afford ICJ judgments immediate domestic effect still give rise to international obligations that may generate diplomatic remedies; (c) the underlying treaty on which the judgment was based may be self-executing; and (d) Congress is competent to execute non-self-executing obligations.' 22 In short, the Court's concern for both the foreign affairs discretion of the political branches and U.S. relations with other countries supported the conclusion that the relevant treaty obligations were not self-executing.
111.
The Court also concluded that the non-self-executing character of the treaty obligations at issue in Medellin was "confirmed by the 'postratification understanding' of signatory nations."' ' 23 "[T]he lack of any basis for supposing that any other country would treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of their domestic law" led the Court to conclude "that the treaty should not be so viewed in our courts.
' 12 4 Because other nations had not assumed such an obligation, the Court concluded that it should not assume a unilateral obligation to that effect on behalf of the United States.
125
The potential consequences of concluding that the treaty obligations in Medellin were self-executing likewise supported the Court's non-selfexecution holding. If ICJ judgments were unassailable federal law, they could not only override both state and federal law, but also prevent federal or state courts from evaluating ICJ orders that went so far as to "annul criminal convictions and sentences, for any reason deemed suffi- [Vol. 50:2 cient by the ICJ. ' 126 Even the dissent was unwilling to treat all ICJ judgments-for example, "politically sensitive judgments"-as selfexecuting.
127
Like the analysis in Sosa, Medellin's self-execution analysis reflects a limited role for the judiciary in domestic lawmaking and foreign affairs. The Medellin Court explicitly relied on the Constitution's delegation of the conduct of foreign affairs to the political departments in concluding that the relevant treaties did not give rise to self-executing obliobligations. 128 In response to Justice Breyer's dissent, the Court criticized a conception of the self-execution doctrine that gave too much discretion to the judiciary at the expense of the political branches.
129
The Court concluded that Congress and the executive-not the federal judiciary-should have "the primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will be enforced."
The Medellin Court's reliance on the separation of lawmaking and foreign affairs powers, paralleling the Court's vision in Sosa, lends support to the revisionist perspective on CIL's domestic legal status. Medellin also supports the revisionist viewpoint in at least two other ways.
First, one might attack the revisionist reading of Sosa by arguing that Sosa perceives CIL as a body of U.S. law and deals solely with whether CIL may be fitted to a cause of action. 13 ' I, along with Professors Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley, have previously explained why Sosa should be read as addressing the incorporation of CIL into U.S. law.
32
Medellin lends additional support to the dualist position that CIL is outside U.S. law, not merely a body of U.S. law that may not readily be fitted to a cause of action. The Medellin Court repeatedly suggested that non-self-executing treaties are not domestic law, rather than domestic law that is merely judicially unenforceable. 133 134 While these references may merely be shorthand for describing domestic law that is not judicially enforceable, they may also suggest that the Court intuits that international law is a body of law outside the domestic system. Second, even if the Court perceives non-self-executing treaties and CIL as some form of judicially unenforceable domestic law, it appears that at least one of its members contemplates a more limited role for CIL than for treaties. Justice Breyer-one of the Court's more transnationalist justices--did not reject non-self-execution in Medellin, but rather perceived it as having a more limited application than the majority allowed. Under Justice Breyer's approach, more treaties, including the treaties at issue in Medellin,1 35 would be self-executing and therefore enforceable by U.S. courts. By contrast, in his concurrence in Sosa, Justice Breyer argued for a limit on the incorporation of CIL beyond the limits the majority recognized. 136 While endorsing considerations of specific definition, wide acceptance, deference to the executive, and alternative means of enforcement, Justice Breyer was also concerned that ."); id. at 1370 (referring to "the President's asserted authority to create domestic law pursuant to a non-selfexecuting treaty" and to "transforming an international obligation into domestic law"); id. at 1371 (referring both to giving "the ICJ's decision in Avena the force of domestic law" and to creating domestic law); id. at 1372 (" [T] he Avena judgment is not domestic law."); id. at 1374 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that the Avena judgment "constitutes an international law obligation" even though it "is not 'the supreme Law of the Land' (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2)).
134. Id. at 1378 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1390 (describing the majority as holding "that the Nation's international legal obligation to enforce the ICJ's decision is not automatically a domestic legal obligation"). tion over claims by foreign nationals who are injured abroad by foreign conduct, Justice Breyer would consider whether there is a "procedural consensus" that the conduct in question warrants universal jurisdiction-that is, authorization for any state to exercise jurisdiction to prosecute the conduct. 138 If such a consensus exists, then principles of comity are not threatened and adjudication of a CIL-based claim is appropriappropriate.
1 39 The important point, however, is that Justice Breyer saw a more limited domestic role for CIL than did the Sosa majority, but he favored a broader role for treaties than did the majority in Medellin. Justice Breyer, at least, would seem to appreciate the revisionist position that CIL's domestic status should be more circumscribed than that of treaties because treaties are formally negotiated and approved by the political branches and are specifically included in the Supremacy Clause's catalogue of supreme federal law. 1 40
III. MEDELLIN AND DEVELOPING UNIFORMITY FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The Supreme Court's treatment of CIL in Sosa and treaties in Medellin likely results in a greater domestic role for treaties than for CIL. To the extent that uniform considerations, particularly political branch intent and specific definition, govern questions of both treaty selfexecution and CIL incorporation, treaties are likely to enjoy a broader role in the U.S. legal system than CIL. 4 ' Treaties themselves provide evidence of the political branches' intent, and they contain written obligations that a court can evaluate for specific definition.
142
Medellin supports the claim that a uniform doctrine governs the domestic status of both treaties and CIL. I previously argued, in light of Sosa's treatment of customary international law, that a doctrinal uniformity was emerging. 43 That argument, however, relied on selfexecution considerations that were pieced together from Supreme Court mise that the ATS was designed to limit federal judicial authority to hear CIL-based claims and proceed to assume that Justice Breyer was unwilling to consider the plaintiff's claim outside the confines of the ATS. and circuit court decisions. 44 The Supreme Court had not previously provided extensive guidance on the content of the self-execution analysis. Medellin changed that: Medellin paints the fullest picture of the factors governing self-execution to date.
As the discussion above details, the primary consideration governing self-execution is the intent of the political branches. Specific definition, mutuality, practical consequences, foreign relations effects, and alternative means of enforcement contribute to the inquiry. A court is more likely to conclude that a treaty is self-executing if there is evidence that the political branches intended the treaty to be self-executing. That intent can be located in treaty text that imposes specifically defined obligations that reflect judicially enforceable standards. On the other hand, a treaty is less likely to be deemed self-executing if: (a) other states party to the treaty have not assumed a self-executing obligation; 145 (b) the practical consequences of a self-executing classification are sweeping or otherwise give pause; 146 (c) self-execution would produce untoward foreign affairs effects, including disruption of relations with other countries or constriction of the foreign affairs discretion of the political branches; 147 or (d) the treaty contemplates alternative means of enforcement.
148
These factors parallel the considerations that the Supreme Court laid down in Sosa to guide the incorporation of norms of customary international law. As noted above, the Sosa Court focused on the intent of the political branches (specifically, the First Congress) to identify the source and scope of federal judicial authority to incorporate CIL norms. It sought norms of CIL that were specifically defined and well accepted by other states, unlike Alvarez-Machain's claim based on an abstract prohibition on arbitrary detention. The Court also considered the practical consequences and foreign relations effects of creating a CIL-based 144. Id. at 10-11. 145. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25 (highlighting the Medellin Court's observation that other states do not treat ICJ judgments as immediately enforceable in domestic courts).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27 (noting the Medellin Court's apprehension that self-execution could give rise to unassailable ICJ judgments that preempt state and federal law and overturn criminal convictions).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 113-19 (discussing the Medellin Court's observation that self-execution would, inter alia, eliminate the political branches' discretion to decide "whether and how to comply with" ICJ judgments); supra text accompanying notes 120-22 (outlining the Medellin Court's concern that states would be hesitant to enter treaties if the judiciary possessed significant discretion to decide if and when treaties are self-executing).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14 (discussing the Medellin Court's reliance on the contingent and political enforcement of ICJ judgments in the Security Council).
[Vol. 50:2 cause of action, including opening the flood gates to alien claims based on unauthorized detention and eclipsing political branch authority over foreign affairs by creating problems with other states. Finally, the Sosa Court expressed willingness to consider alternative means of enforcement, such as exhaustion of local remedies.
The confluence of considerations in Medellin and Sosa not only reflects a consistent separation of powers vision, but also suggests that a uniform doctrine governing the domestic status of both treaties and CIL is not merely emerging but developing. 149 Although the Supreme Court has yet to note this uniformity-the opinion in Medellin does not so much as cite Sosa-the parallels between the considerations governing treaty self-execution and CIL incorporation are apparent. Under this unifying doctrine, neither treaties nor customary international law will automatically qualify as enforceable domestic law, but treaties will be more likely to qualify than CIL. 50
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Medellin has predictably generated debate regarding its significance for the domestic role of treaties. Medellin's import, however, reaches farther than the literature has acknowledged. The decision diminishes prospects for ATS litigation based on violations of treaties by undercutting the number of treaties that may be judicially enforced at the behest of private individuals. The decision also limits ATS litigation based on breaches of CIL by reducing the number of treaties that may provide evidence of actionable CIL norms.
More significantly, Medellin's separation of powers vision lends support to the claim that the Supreme Court favors the revisionist view of customary international law. The revisionist view leaves the political branches to decide the extent to which the federal judiciary may rely on CIL as a rule of decision. The result is that Medellin directly limits the domestic role of treaties in U.S. courts and indirectly undermines reliance on CIL by the federal judiciary. Equally important, the decision evidences the development of a uniform doctrine governing the domestic status of both treaties and CIL-a doctrine under which the intent of the political branches, complemented by considerations of specificity, mutuality, practical consequences, foreign affairs effects, and alternative 149 . See Moore, supra note 4. 150. See id. at 51.
